Is it permissible for individuals or vigilante groups to use physical or psychological force to enact the duty of enjoining good (amr bi-l-maʿrūf) and forbidding evil (nahī ʿan al-munkar)?

The Islamic principle of amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa nahī ʿan al-munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) is a duty that is endowed upon every Muslim. This duty seeks to promote virtues and deeds that are emphasised in Islamic scripture. Some Muslim jurists have categorised this duty/obligation as individual (ʿaynī) and collective (kifāʾī).¹ As individuals, all Muslims must promote good behaviour (and forbid bad behaviour) amongst their societies, families, and friends. However, if some Muslims enact this duty then the obligation is lifted from the rest of the Muslims. According to some Muslim jurists, the following conditions must be fulfilled for the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil to become obligatory:

a) The enactor of the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil must have the capacity to understand what is ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ There may be instances when an enactor may consider something to be good/evil, however in reality their consideration is erroneous. For instance, an enactor may tell a perpetrator that their action of doing Eid on a particular day is wrong. However, the perpetrator may have a religious excuse on performing Eid on that day, as s/he is following the opinion of another jurist that contradicts the opinion the jurist the enactor follows.

b) An enactor must deem it probable that their efforts of enjoining good and forbidding evil will be effective on the perpetrator.

c) An enactor can only enjoin good and forbid evil if they are sure that the perpetrator would continue doing improper/wrong actions. If the perpetrator does not wish to continue repeating their improper/wrong actions, then it is not obligatory on the enactor to enjoin good and forbid evil.

d) The enactor must ensure that the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil does not bring about unbearable hardship or endangers themselves or others.

According to some Muslim jurists the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil is carried out in a hierarchical order:

1. The enactor must first express their disapproval by displaying heartfelt aversion towards the perpetrator. For example, by turning away their face and/or not speaking to the perpetrator.

2. If displaying heartfelt aversion does not lead to the desired outcome, then the enactor must verbally advise and/or guide the perpetrator to rectify their actions.

3. If verbally advising and/or guiding the perpetrator does not lead to the desired outcome, then the enactor must intervene by physically forcing the perpetrator to rectify their actions. For example, this may be carried out in the form of hitting or imprisoning.

Although the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil promotes good behaviour, social justice, and prevents corruption, its practise in the modern-day context is problematic as there is disagreement on who has the authority to enact it. It is worth noting that there have been occasional reports of self-appointed individuals or small vigilante groups attempting to impose their own interpretation of Sharia law in certain communities. These individuals or groups may engage in activities such as enforcing moral codes, pressuring individuals to adhere to specific religious practices, or resolving disputes within their community based on their interpretation of Islamic law. These groups consist of individuals that often operate outside the official legal system and take it upon themselves to enforce what they perceive as Islamic morality. For instance, we see numerous examples of slandering, character assassination, psychological abuse, and even at times physical violence and threats against people under the guise of enacting the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil. This is a growing concern especially at a time when a host of differing opinions and viewpoints are widely accessible and circulated across various social media platforms.

The main problem arises when individuals or vigilante groups, operating under the pretext of the obligatory duty of promoting good and preventing evil, take it upon themselves to use physical or psychological force to control the actions of others they perceive as improper. This raises the question of whether Sharia law permits individuals or vigilante groups to employ such force while carrying out this duty.

ICCI Opinion 

It is not permissible for individuals or vigilante groups to utilise physical or psychological force² when carrying out the duty of enjoining good (amr bi-l-maʿrūf) and forbidding evil (nahī ʿan al-munkar). Instead, they should rely solely on non-violent methods that foster dialogue and facilitate positive transformations within society while promoting what is right and deterring what is wrong.

Justifications 

1. There are numerous verses in the Quran that mention the duty of enforcing good and prohibiting evil. However, the Quran does not prescribe a specific method on how this duty is enacted. For instance:

There is no explicit command in the Quran to use physical or psychological force to enact the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Instead, the unrestricted apparent indication of Quran 16:125 emphasises that individuals should generally ensure that they debate with others with kindness and good manners:

2. There are two groups of narrations that shed light on the tradition (Sunna) of the Prophet and Imams. The first group of narrations outline the general notions of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Like the Quran, this group does not give an explicit command to individuals to use physical or psychological force to enact enjoining good and forbidding evil. For instance:

I. The Prophet said:

II. Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq said:

In contrast, the second group of narrations elucidate the permissibility of individuals intervening by using force to enact enjoining good and forbidding evil. There are many narrations found in this group, here are some examples:

Imam al-Bāqir said:

This narration cannot be relied upon and is deemed as being weak. This is because its chain of transmission mentions unknown narrators, including Bishr b. Abī ʿAbd Allah⁹ and Abi ʿIṣmah, the Qāḍī of Marw¹⁰. Moreover, there are gaps (irsāl) within the chain of transmission of this narration and this further questions its reliability and authenticity.

I. Ibn Abū Laylā said I heard Imam ʿAlī say when meeting the people of Shām:

According to Shīʿī scholars of biography (al-rijāl) this narration cannot be relied upon because Ibn Abū Laylā is unknown (majhūl) and therefore this narration is deemed as being weak¹². Moreover, there are gaps within this narration’s chain of transmission which further questions its reliability and authenticity.

II. In Tafsīr al-imam al-ʿAskarī, Imam ʿAskarī narrates that the Prophet said:

However, this narration is not authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) due to the unreliability of its narrators, including al-Ḥasan Alī b. Muḥammad b. Sayyār¹⁴ and Abū Yaʿqūb b. Yūsuf b. Muḥammad b. Ziyād, and many Shīʿī scholars reject it. For instance, Sayyid al-Khūʾī doubts the authenticity of this tafsīr. ¹⁵ 

In essence, the second group of narrations cannot be relied upon due to the weakness of their transmission and therefore they do not provide enough confidence (iṭminān) to assure that they are transmitted from the Prophet and/or Imams. More importantly, the apparent indication of these narrations contradicts the unrestricted apparent indication of Quran 16:125, which as mentioned emphasises that individuals should ensure that they guide or admonish others with kindness and good manners.

3. It is important to know that even if some were to argue that not all narrations mentioned within the second group are weak and thus it is permissible to use violence or “the hand” to enjoin good and forbid evil, then an alternative interpretation can be offered. For instance, ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī reports that some scholars such as Sallar al-Daylami (d. 448/1056) interpret “the hand” in the narration attributed to Imam Askarī, as a moral exemplar who takes the responsibility of enjoining good and forbidding evil by setting a virtuous standard for others to emulate. As opposed to someone who uses physical violence to enjoin good and prohibit evil¹⁶. Ḥillī deduces this interpretation from the narration’s sequence of actions, which as mentioned begins with “the hand,” progresses to “the tongue,” and culminates with “the heart.” Ḥillī seems to be cognisant of the fact that if the first step in enjoining good and forbidding evil involved physical violence, then this could lead to a host of other problems such as oppression, intimidation/bullying, abuse of power and coercion and thus become an impediment to using “the tongue” or “the heart” to enjoin good and forbid evil.

It is important to note Ḥillī’s interpretation can be supported with a host of other narrations that mention that a Muslim must lead by a good example. For instance:

ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Yaʿfūr reports that Imam al-Ṣādiq stated:

Imam al-Ṣādiq advised:

Imam al-Ṣādiq stated:

Therefore, there is no explicit injunction from the Quran regarding the utility of physical and psychological force to enact the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Moreover, there is a doubt surrounding the authenticity of the second group of narrations. In contrast, Quran 16:125 and a host of other narrations emphasise that Muslims should ensure that they guide or admonish others with kindness, good manners, and lead by example. As such, the Sharia does not endorse individuals or vigilante groups to use physical and psychological force to enact the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil.

References

^{1. To help clarify this further, commanding someone to perform obligatory acts and forbidding them from prohibited (ḥarām) acts, sometimes falls into thecategory of an individual obligation (wājib al-ʿaynī) or a communalobligation (wājib al-kifāʾī). Enacting the principle of ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’, is seen as an individual obligation insofar as verbally giving a person/s guidance and advice, and also showing discomfort towards the bad act that is taking place. However, there are times when enacting the principle of ‘enjoining good and forbidding evil’ is only possible through physical means/force, only in these cases does the obligation become communal (wājib al-kifāʾī).}

^{2. By psychological we mean force/threats associated with racism, bullying, discrimination, cyber bullying by way of character assassination, exploitation, repression of free press. All these forms which may not necessarily be physical but amounts to psychological force being applied to a person or group/s.}

^{3. Quran 9:71.}

^{4. Quran 7:157.}

^{5. Quran 3:103-4.}

^{6. Tahdhīb al-aḥkām, 6:181.}

^{7. Ibid., 6:180-1; al-Kāfī 5:56.}

^{8. Tahdhīb al-aḥkām, 6:180-81; al-Kāfī, 5:55-6; Wasāʾil al-shīʿā, 16:133; Kitābal-amr wa al-nahī, chapter 3, 1.}

^{9. Khūʾī, Muʿjam rijāl al-ḥadīth, 3:318-19.}

^{10. Ibid, 21:240, number 14544.}

^{11. Nahjal-balāghah, 4:89; Rawḍat al-wāʿiẓīn,364; Wasāʾil al-shīʿā, 16:133; Kitāb al-amr wal-nahī, chapter 3, 8.}

^{12. Khūʾī, Muʿjam rijāl al-ḥadīth, 19:298-9, number 6332.}

^{13. Tafsīral-imam al-ʿAskarī, 480, Wasāʾilal-shīʿā, 16:135; Kitāb al-amr wa al-nahī,chapter 3, 12; cf. ʿAwalī al-lathāmī,1:431.}

^{14. Muʿjam rijāl al-ḥadīth, 12:147, number 8428.}

^{15. Ibid, 20:175, number 13809.}

_{16. Ḥamza b. ʿAbd al- ʿAzīz al-Daylamī,al-Marāsim fī al-fiqh al-Imām, 263 in Mukhtalif al-Shīʿa fi aḥkāmal-shīʿa 474-55.}

_{17. Wasāʾil al-shīʿā12:162, hadith no. 15955.}

_{18. Aḥmad b. Muḥammadb. Khālid al-Barqī, al-Maḥāsin, (Qom: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1992), 1:18.}

_{19. Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī, al-Sarāʾir al-ḥāwī li-taḥrīral-fatāwī, (Qom: Muʾassasa al-Nashr al-Islāmi al-Tābiʿ li-jamāʿ al-Mudarrisīn, 1989), 3:350.}

^{20. Al-Kulayni, al-Kāfī,2:78.}